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The Affordable Care Act and Entrepreneurship Lock: An Updated Examination of 
Employer-Based Healthcare’s Effect on Self-employment by Demographic Group 
Abstract 
This paper capitalizes on a natural experiment created by differences in Medicaid expansion under The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). A difference and difference model comparing states 
that did and did not expand Medicaid is conducted to investigate if providing an alternative and low-cost 
source of health insurance affects self-employment rates overall and across different demographic 
groups. The results suggest that living in a state that expanded Medicaid was associated with a 1.4 
percent increase in the likelihood that an individual will be self-employed and that this effect is 
heterogeneous across different demographics, being largest among African Americans. 
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Introduction 
Newly formed businesses are the engine of the American economy. Firms less than a year old 
are wholly responsible for yearly net job growth in the United States and without firm creation, 
net employment would likely fall by about 1 percent a year (Kane 2010; Haltiwanger, et al. 
2008). Firms that survive past their first year experience a higher average growth rate of 16 
percent and make disproportionately large contributions to output and productivity growth 
(Haltiwanger, et al. 2008; Haltiwanger, et al. 2016). In fact, new businesses are so critical to 
economic growth that some economist have argued that “to the extent that policy interventions 
aimed at small businesses ignore the important role of firm age, we should not expect much of an 
impact on the pace of job creation.” (Haltiwanger, et al. 2013 pg 360) 
 Despite the important economic impact newly formed firms have on output, the rate of 
business formulation has been declining since the mid-2000s. As shown in Graph 1, this decline 
began before the Great Recession and has not improved in the years thereafter, suggesting that 
the decline is not solely due to fluctuations in the business cycles. To spur additional economic 
growth and reverse this trend, existing barriers to entrepreneurship and self-employment should 
be removed.  
Graph 1. Business Formations within 4 Quarters (BF4Q) - Actual and Projected, 
Seasonally Adjusted 
 
Note: Business formulation within 4 quarters (BF4Q) is a forward-looking measure of business applications that 
turned into businesses with payroll within four quarters of their application. The above graph shows actual BF4Q 
through Q4 of 2014 and is estimates thereafter. This graph is from US Census Bureau (2018). 
 One such barrier to entrepreneurship in the United States may be both the availability and 
prohibitive cost of healthcare. Before the 2008 financial crisis, small business owners 
consistently cited health insurance costs as one of their greatest concerns (SBA 2009). In 2010, 
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45 percent of people who purchased their own health insurance did so because they were self-
employed (KFF 2010).  
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) tried to alleviate this problem. 
Passed in 2010, the ACA’s main goal was to reduce the number of uninsured people in the 
United States, but some supporters claimed that it would also spur business creation. When 
talking about ACA before its passage, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (2010) said:  
“Imagine an economy where people could follow their aspirations,...Where they could be 
self-employed or start a business, not be job-locked in a job because they have health care 
there, and if they went out on their own it would be unaffordable to them.” (para. 27) 
While the Act was successful at reducing the number of uninsured people in the United States by 
about 20 million people (Antonisse & Rudowitz 2019), questions remain if the ACA created 
gains in self-employment and if those gains were uniform across different demographic groups.  
 This paper attempts to answer this question by using data from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) to construct a difference in difference model comparing self-employment rates 
overall and by demographic group in states that expanded Medicaid under ACA to states that did 
not. This paper will also be the first to account for state political factors in examining Medicaid’s 
impact on entrepreneurship, thereby supplementing previous research in the area.   
 
Is employer-based healthcare a barrier to self-employment? 
 
Economists have theorized that employer-based health insurance may decrease job mobility as 
workers fear separating from their current job and losing their employer-provided group health 
insurance only to be forced into the more expensive individual health insurance market (Holtz-
Eakin 1993). This idea, called “Job Lock,” has been widely studied by economists over the last 
30 years. A paper by Grueber and Madrian (2002) that reviewed 50 studies on job lock 
concluded that there is “on net strong evidence of job lock” (pg. 35). A systematic review of 
literature examining the existence of job lock by the Government Accountability Office (GAO 
2011) found that 29 of 31 examined studies provided supporting evidence (pg. 6). With a 
relatively strong empirical backing that job lock between salaried positions exist, some 
economists have begun to ask if employer-based health insurance creates similar barriers to 
entrepreneurship and self-employment.  
 The prevalence of the employer-based healthcare system and a lack of affordable 
insurance alternatives may create specific barriers to self-employment and “entrepreneurship 
lock” via two main channels. First, employer-based non-portable health insurance increases the 
already high risk of starting a new business by forcing would be entrepreneurs to forgo existing 
employer-based insurance to pursue self-employment (risk channel). Second, the high cost of 
individual health insurance coverage may diminish the amount of capital an entrepreneur has to 
2
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 17 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol17/iss1/5
launch their business or use as collateral to secure outside financing (credit channel) (Olds 
2016a).  
The first paper to empirically examine the existence of entrepreneurship lock was by 
Holtz-Enkin, Penrod and Rosen (1996). The trio used data from the Survey of Program 
Participation (SIPP) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to investigate if a lack of 
health insurance portability affects the likelihood that an individual will become self-employed. 
Using a difference in difference model, they examined individuals with existing employer-based 
health insurance. They compared variations in the probability that an individual will become 
self-employed between those whose spouse had employer-based insurance (portable insurance) 
and those whose spouse did not (non-portable insurance). This within group comparison attempts 
to avoids erroneous conclusions from the “good job” problem, where having employer based 
health insurance may indicate that an individual has a good job and would be less likely to leave 
this job to become self-employed than someone with a bad job without health insurance. 
Additionally, the trio uses a respondent’s self-reported health status to produce a second 
difference in difference estimator that proxies the value an individual put on their insurance, with 
worse health indicating that an individual values their healthcare more. They predict that poorer 
health and non-portable health insurance creates a lower propensity to become an entrepreneur. 
Contrary to their prediction, Holtz-Enkin, Penrod, and Rosen do not find evidence that a lack of 
health insurance portability affects self-employment. However, their results suffer from large 
standard errors. The trio explained their results by arguing that starting a business is a risky 
endeavor, and those who choose to undertake it are unswayed by the additional risks of losing 
health insurance coverage.  
Yet, other researchers have found robust evidence of entrepreneurship lock. Fairle, Kapur 
and Gates supplement Holz-Enkin, Penrod, and Rosen’s model by taking advantage of the 
continuous surveying methods of the Current Population Survey (CPS) and created matched 
panel data. With this methodology, they found a large negative effect of poor health status and 
non-portable insurance in predicting self-employment, suggesting that employer-based health 
care does create entrepreneurship lock. Their findings are similar to those by Madrian (1998), 
who found that a lack of health insurance portability accounts for a 25 percent reduction in the 
business creation, and results from Wellington (2001), who estimated that a guaranteed 
alternative source of healthcare would increase business formulation by somewhere between 2.3 
to 4.4 percent for husbands and 1.2 to 4.6 percent for wives.  
Fairle, Kapur and Gates (2010) also pioneered a new methodology to examine 
entrepreneurship lock in their paper. They performed a regression discontinuity analysis 
examining the probability that elderly full-time male workers are self-employed just before and 
just after they turn 65, when they become eligible for Medicare. They find that business 
ownership rates increase between the ages 64 to 65 but do not increase similarly over other age 
gains between 55 and 75 years old, providing additional evidence of entrepreneurship lock. 
Table 1 below summarizes this previous research on entrepreneurship lock. 
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Table 1. Empirical Evidence on Entrepreneurship Lock 
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"The Effect of Health 
Insurance on Transitions 












Yes Health insurance 
coverage status has a 
statistically significant 
effect on self-
employment and that a 
lack of portable health 
insurance seems to 
reduce business creation 
by 25 percent.  
 
The Impact of an Alternative Healthcare Source on “Entrepreneurship Lock” 
 
In addition to establishing the existence and prevalence of entrepreneurship lock, researchers 
have examined if alternative sources of healthcare, mainly those provided by the public sector, 
can promote business formulation. Public health insurance may diminish entrepreneurship lock 
by providing a portable low-cost alternative to employer-based insurance thus alleviating both 
the risk and credit barriers to self-employment.  
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Olds (2016a) examined how the implementation of the national State Child Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP) affected self-employment rates.  Using a difference in regression 
discontinuity model, where families just above the income cutoff for SCHIP and just below the 
income cutoff for SCHIP are compared before and after the program’s implementation, Olds 
found that SCHIP expanded self-employment among covered parents by 15 percent. Olds also 
examined if SCHIP promoted business formulation via the risk or credit channel. He found that 
the increase in self-employment occurs almost entirely from a reduction in risk while only 
minimally impacting credit. Olds thereby extends previous research by Bansak and Raphael 
(2008), who found that SCHIP improved job mobility for males in families with non-portable 
health insurance, to the field of business formulation.  
 Other economists have found evidence that government policy that provided new 
alternatives for healthcare promoted business formulation. DeCicca (2010) examined if New 
Jersey's Individual Health Coverage Plan (IHCP) spurred additional self-employment. IHCP 
helped create an individual healthcare market with coverage and renewal guarantees in the state. 
He found that IHCP increased self-employment rates in the state by 1.1 to 1.6 percent, a 14 to 20 
percent increase from previous self-employment rates. Becker and Tulzman (2015) studied the 
impact of Massachusetts’s 2006 Health Care reform, much of which served as a precursor to the 
Affordable Care Act, on entrepreneurship in the state using a traditional difference in difference 
model and an Instrumental Variable (IV) specification. They found that the reform caused self-
employment rates in the state to rise by 1.2 to 1.5 percent and that the likelihood of becoming 
self-employed at the individual level rose by 6.3 percent. They also found this effect differed 
greatly by gender, as women were 15 percent more likely to become self-employed after the 
reform compared to a 3.2 percent increase in the probability for men.  
 Despite the myriad of natural experiments created by the passage and implementation of 
the Affordable Care Act and a body, albeit it a relatively small one, of existing literature on the 
subject, there seems to only be two studies that examined changes in self-employment due to the 
ACA. Lee (2019) leveraged differences in the state by state implementation of the Medicaid 
expansion under the Affordable Care Act to create a natural experiment that provides evidence of 
how this expansion affects the probability of self-employment. Using this difference in 
difference approach, Lee found that the Medicaid expansion caused a 0.8 to 1.6 percent increase 
in self-employment rates among low-income childless adults. Additionally, he found that newly 
covered childless adults became 8 to 11 percent more likely to be self-employed due to a lack in 
the risk of not being uninsured. Callison and Sicilian (2018) also examined the Medicaid 
expansion under the ACA but looked broadly at its effects on labor market outcomes. While they 
did find evidence that the expansion increased labor market freedom, they find no evidence that 
the expansion increased self-employment rates overall. They did, however, find evidence that 
self-employment rose for specific demographic groups, such as white women. Table 2 below 
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Table 2. Empirical Evidence of Alternative Healthcare on Entrepreneurship 
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“Health Insurance and the 
Supply of Entrepreneurs: 
Evidence from the ACA 







between the ages of 
26 and 64 in low-
income households 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion 
caused a 0.8 to 1.6 percent 
increase in self-employment 
rates among low-income 
childless adults and that newly 
covered childless adults were 8 
to 11 percent more likely to be 
self-employed.  
“Economic freedom and the 
affordable care act: Medicaid 
expansions and labor mobility 
by race and ethnicity” by 





between the ages of 
18 and 65 in low-
income households 
No evidence that the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion increased 
self-employment overall but they 
did find evidence that the 
expansion promoted self-
employment among some 
demographic groups. 
  
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) represented the most significant changes 
to the healthcare system in the United States since the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 
1965. ACA made many large-scale policy changes, including (Altman & Schatman 2011 pg 
253): 
• Ending the practice wherein insurance companies could deny coverage to an individual 
because of a pre-existing condition 
• Creating state-run insurance exchanges for individuals and small businesses 
• Creating tax credits for low-income individuals and small businesses to buy private 
coverage  
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• Expanding Medicaid to individuals at 138 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL) 
These changes could spur entrepreneurship by both increasing the availability and decreasing 
the cost of nonemployer-based health insurance. While three of these components were 
implemented as planned, the Medicaid expansion was not. In June of 2012, the Supreme Court 
ruled in National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius that it was 
unconstitutional to force states to expand Medicaid eligibility. States were therefore given the 
choice to expanded Medicaid creating a natural experiment. States could choose to expand 
coverage through legislation, an executive order, or a ballot initiative. To date 35 states and DC 
have expanded Medicaid, leaving only 15 states yet to expand the program (KFF 2020).    
While other papers have utilized this natural experiment to examine the effect of the 
Medicaid expansions on self-employment, this paper will supplement previous research in 
several ways. First, it will build upon the existing literature on entrepreneurship lock and social 
insurance by providing additional evidence of how Medicaid expansion impacts firm creation. 
Second, this paper supplements Lee’s existing research by adding an additional year, and 
supplements Callison and Sicilian research by adding an additional five years of previously 
unexplored data. Third, this paper will be one of only a few papers to examine the expansions 
effect on entrepreneurship by demographic group. Finally, this will be the first paper to include 
state political factors in the analysis, thereby accounting for a previously ignored possible 
omitted variable.  
 
Data 
The data comes from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the US Census Bureau. CPS is a monthly nationally 
representative survey of households that collects information on labor force participation and 
workforce statistics. ASEC is a yearly supplement to the basic monthly CPS survey and is 
conducted in March with over 75,000 households. ASEC asks respondents a wide variety of 
questions about their households and their activities over the previous year including 
demographic information, employment status, income, health status, and health coverage. ASEC 
provides information about the respondents from the year prior to the survey year. The data used 
ranges from the 2004 to 2019 ASEC surveys, therefore allowing analysis from 2003 to 2018.  
 The sample is restricted to childless adults between the ages of 26 and 64 to avoid biases 
that may arise from alternative health insurance. As previously mentioned, ACA allowed young 
adults under the age of 26 to be covered by their parent’s employer-based health insurance and 
individuals above 65 years old are eligible for Medicare. The sample is restricted to childless 
adults specifically to avoid additional basis from programs like SCHIP and because childless 
adults saw the largest expansion of Medicaid eligibility under the ACA reforms. This sample is 
also further restricted into two samples based on income.  
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 The first restricted sample (Sample A) only includes those below 300 percent of the 
federal poverty line (FPL). While ACA only expanded Medicaid to individuals with below 138 
percent of FPL, Medicaid eligibility is based off modified adjusted gross income (MAGI), which 
includes certain deductions that likely would not be reported by respondents in the survey. The 
self-employed may also underreport their income in tax filings to be below 138 percent of the 
FPL to be eligible for Medicaid but may report a higher income in the survey.1 Finally, since the 
survey asks about income from the previous year there could be recall bis. The 300 percent 
sample is used to adjust for these factors. This 300 percent sample could be biased by individuals 
who use subsidies available to those below 400 percent of the FPL under ACA. To account for 
these problems the analysis is also conducted with a sample restricted to those below 138 percent 
of the FPL (Sample B).  
 State that expanded Medicaid after the initial expansion in 2014 are excluded from the 
analysis. States that are operating their Medicaid program with a Section 1115 waiver, which 
allows the state to implement an alternative expansion plan than the one stipulated under federal 
law, are also excluded from the analysis. Massachusetts and Vermont are excluded as they 
almost fully expanded Medicaid before 2014. Wisconsin is excluded because the state refused to 
take part in the Medicaid expansion under ACA but did expand Medicaid up to 100 percent of 
the FPL. With these exceptions, the analysis includes 31 states, 16 that expanded Medicaid and 
15 that did not.  Table 3 below outlines whether a state is excluded from the analysis, in the 
control group, or in the treatment group and why. The Appendix also has a map (graph A) that 
shows which states are in the treatment group (blue), control group (brown), and are excluded 
from the analysis (purple). 
Table 3. States Included in Analysis 
No Medicaid Expansion Medicaid Expansion 
Included in Analysis: 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Wyoming, 
Oklahoma, North Carolina 
Included in Analysis: 
Washington, California, Nevada, 
Colorado, Minnesota, North 
Dakota, Illinois, West Virginia, 
Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, 
New York, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, Kentucky, Oregon 
 
Excluded from Analysis:2 
Arizona┴, Massachusetts∞, New 
Mexico┴, Ohio┴, Maine╪ 
Louisiana╪, Montana╪┴, Virginia╪┴, 
Utah┴, Iowa┴, Michigan╪┴, New 
Hampshire╪┴, Alaska╪, 
Pennsylvania╪, Arkansas┴, Utah╪┴, 
Hawaii, Vermont¥, Wisconsin€, 
Idaho╪ Indiana╪┴,  
All the information on ACA Medicaid expansion is from Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF):  https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-
indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D#note-4 
 
1 Empirical evidence has shown that the self-employed at much more likely to report income near some arbitrary 
change in income that effects eligibility or marginal tax rates (called “bunching”). For greater discussion of 
bunching see Kleven (2016). 
2 ┴ indicates a state approved Section 1115 waivers to operate their Medicaid expansion programs in ways not 
otherwise allowed under federal law. ╪ indicates that a state expanded Medicare after 2014. ∞ indicates that a state 
implemented reforms similar to the Affordable Care Act before 2014. Under MassHealth Medicaid Waivers, adults 
were covered up to 133% of the FPL in Massachusetts.  €Wisconsin expanded Medicare up to 100% of the FPL but 
did not join the expansion under ACA. ¥Vermont Fully expanded Medicaid before 2014. 
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Parallel Trends Assumption and A Preliminary Look at Self-Employment levels 
The key assumption for a difference in difference model is parallel trends. This assumption 
means that without a treatment, the difference between the treatment and the control group 
would be constant. For the assumption to hold in this context, it must be true that without the 
Medicaid expansion trends in self-employment in expansion and non-expansion states would be 
the same. Below is a trend graph of self-employment rates in both groups across the time period 
studied (graph 2). The graph clearly shows that the two groups operated under similar trends 
before the expansion, providing some evidence that the parallel trend assumption holds.  
Graph 2. Number of Self-Employed Individuals Overtime by 
Expansion Status 
Note: This graph was composed using the whole data set, not one of the income restricted samples. This was done to 
better capture the general trend in self-employment between the two groups. Medicaid expansion for all included 
states was 2014, making the pre-period 2003 to 2013 and the post-period 2014-2018.  
Previous research examining the Medicaid expansion under ACA has also performed 
additional statistical tests on this assumption and found it to hold.3 While this all suggests that 
the assumption holds, if it was violated the results would be biased and invalid.   
Baseline Difference in Difference Models 
The first model will be a baseline difference in difference approach comparing states that did not 
expand Medicaid (control) to states that did expand Medicaid (treatment group). The analysis 
includes 31 states, 15 in the control group and 16 in the treatment group. The pre-period for this 
 
3 Lee (2019) performs an event study of Medicaid expansion and finds the estimated differences between expansion 





























Nonexpansion State Expansion State
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analysis will be 2003 to 2013 and the post-period will be from 2014 to 2018. The baseline 
regression has the following specification: 
Self-Employmentist = αo+β1 (ExpS * Postt) + Xist + δs + τt + εist 
Where Self-Employmentist represents a binary outcome variable for individual i in state s during 
time t.  ExpS is an indicator variable for if a state expanded Medicaid and is interacted with Postt, 
an indicator variable for if the state is in the expansion period. Xist is a set of demographic 
variables including age, sex, race, education, marital status, and if the individual was born in a 
foreign country.4 δs and τt represents fixed state and time effects respectively and are included to 
remove specific time invariant state characteristics and time variant exogenous shocks. Standard 
errors are clustered at the state level and basic linear probability model (LPM) regressions are 
used. This model is based on a similar methodological framework used by Lee (2019).  
 To examine if the expansion had homogenous effects on different demographics groups, 
the baseline model is run with gender and racially specific regressions.5 Demographic specific 
regressions are run for men, women, whites, African Americans, Asians, and Native Americans. 
Gender specific regressions are also run for each racial group. 
Self-employment is the main outcome variable of this regression, but self-employment is 
not identical to entrepreneurship. While a direct measure of entrepreneurship would be 
preferable, this is not possible due to data availability. Self-employment serves as a strong proxy 
for entrepreneurship, capturing risk-tasking and other characteristics traditionally linked with 
entrepreneurship (Parker 2009). Using self-employment also allows for the comparison of these 
results to previous research on entrepreneurship lock, which almost exclusively uses self-
employment.  
Difference in Difference Model with Gubernatorial Regressor 
As with any regression model, if there is some omitted variable that is correlated with both the 
treatment variable (Medicaid expansion) and the outcome variable (self-employment) the 
coefficient estimates will be biased. Partisan control of a state’s executive branch and a state’s 
general political climate overtime may be such a factor. Medicaid expansion is not random but 
instead a consequence of political, usually partisan, action by a state’s government. Additionally, 
the political climate of a state likely influences the business landscape, as the two major political 
parties have differing policy approaches regarding how to support businesses and development. 
 
4 Foreign birth status is included as a control variable because foreign born workers are more likely to be self-
employed than native born workers (Hipple & Hammond 2016). Foreign birth status is also included to allow for 
comparison of the results to previous work (Lee 2019).  
5 For example, the racial regression for African Americans only uses observations from African American 
respondents. Therefore, ExpS * Postt   represents the difference between the probability that an African American 
individual will be self-employed with the Medicaid expansion to the likelihood they would be self-employed 
without the Medicaid expansion. 
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While state fixed effects are included in the baseline model, partisan control of state 
governmental offices changes over the course of the study period and is therefore not time-
invariant. To control for this possible omitted variable, I include a specification of the baseline 
model with additional regressors to account for political variation in the states between 2003 and 
2018. This model has the following specification:  
Self-Employmentist = αo+β1 (ExpS * Postt) + β2 RepGovst + β3RepLegst + 
β4MixedLegst + Xist + δs + τt + εist 
Where all previous variables are the same as the baseline and RepGovst is a dummy variable for 
if state had a Republican governor during a given year, RepLegst is a dummy variable for if the 
Republican party was in control of both chambers of a state’s legislature, and MixedLegst is a 
dummy variable for if both chambers of a state legislature was not controlled by the same party 
for a given year.6 The model accounts for variation within the executive and legislative branches 
in a state as Medicaid could be expanded via the legislative process or via a simple executive 
order. Democratic variables are excluded from this regression to prevent multicollinearity.  
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4 below provides descriptive statistics from the 300 percent FPL sample (Sample 
B) for the treatment and control group in both the pre and post period. It contains information 
demographics, education, economic factors, and variables related to healthcare. The table shows 
that the mean for every variable moves in the same direction between treatment and control 
group in the pre and post time periods for both groups (except for self-employment). The 
treatment group appears to have fewer males, native born citizens, and married people. The 
treatment group appears to be slightly more educated and have higher incomes with fewer 
incorporated business. The difference in the sizes of business between the two groups flips, with 
the treatment group originally having more small firms, less than 25 people, in the pre-expansion 
period but fewer smaller firms in the post period. There are less self-employed people in the 
treatment group before expansion, but more following expansion compared to the control group. 
This could either suggest that the Medicaid expansion did increase self-employment or that there 
are different trends between the two groups, thereby violating the parallel trends assumptions. 
Finally, the treatment group seems to have poorer health in both periods and less employer-based 
healthcare. Not surprisingly, the treatment group seems to have a larger gain in Medicaid than 
the control group in the post period.  
 
 
6 These variables are independently coded for each year. Rhode Island is the only state in the analysis to have a 
Governor who was not part of either the Republican or Democratic Party, as Lincoln Chafee began his Governorship 
as an independent. However, Chafee began identifying as a democrat halfway through his term. 
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Demographic     
Age 46.82 45.37 47.31 45.80 
Male .5166 .5238 .5042 .5160 
Born in US .8250 .7103 .8256 .7217 
Married .3480 .3009 .3215 .2835 
Education     
Less than HS .2304 .2182 .1836 .1839 
HS .3848 .3539 .3915 .3636 
Bachelors  .0998 .1284 .1155 .1331 
Masters .0260 .0335 .0318 .0394 
Professional .0079 .0109 .0084 .0112 
Economic     
Family Income 21,751 22,258 24,404 25,221 
Self-Employment .0674 .0643 .0568 .0623 
Incorporated                               
Business  
.0100 .0089 .0102 .0096 
Small Firm .9898 .9883 .9861 .9787 
Health     
Poor Health .2889 .2466 .2734 .2456 
Employer Based   
Healthcare 
.3410 .3386 .2646 .2602 
Medicaid .1417 .1761 .1754 .3099 
Observations (n) 55,949 69,735 26,876 26,876 
 
The Effect of Medicaid Expansion on Self-Employments Rates 
Table 5 shows the output from the baseline regression on self-employment for both samples. 
There are several interesting findings in this output. First, both samples find that self-
employment in expansion states was statistically significantly higher by about 1.5 percent 
compared to non-expansion states. However, this increase is only significant at 10 percent 
significance level in the 138 percent sample (likely due to the smaller number of observations in 
this sample). These results are slightly larger than those found by Lee (2019).  
Second, it seems that the Medicaid expansion did not have equal effects for all 
subgroups. The larger 300 percent sample finds significant increases for both genders, whites, 
and African Americans, with black men having the largest gains. The smaller 138 percent sample 
finds similar results for African Americans but at a large magnitude, as their self-employment 
rates are found to be 3.49 percent higher in expansion states than in non-expansion states when 
using this sample. While other ethnic groups also experience higher levels of self-employment 
across the board (the only exception being Native American women), these effects are smaller, 
sometimes less than 1 percent, and are not statistically significant (once again likely due to 
smaller sample sizes). These results seem to suggest that while Medicaid expansion increased the 
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self-employment rate across the board, these gains were concentrated within the African 
American community.  
Table 5. Results from Baseline Difference in Difference Regressions by Demographic 
Group 
 
















Exp*Post 0.0154*** 0.0163** 0.0143*** 0.0133** 0.0263** -0.000131 0.0375 
 (0.00419) (0.00708) (0.00506) (0.00599) (0.0104) (0.0223) (0.0346) 
Observations (A) 179,201 92,732 86,469 126,451 36,129 8,755 3,463 
R-squared (A) 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.019 0.012 0.028 0.045 
Sample B: FPL<138% 
Exp*Post 0.0146* 0.0224* 0.00655 0.0125 0.0349*** 0.000699 0.0795 
  (0.00752) (0.0132) (0.00685) (0.0112) (0.0121) (0.0356) (0.0699) 
Observations (B) 74,830 36,971 37,859 50,267 17,230 3,633 1,822 
R-squared (B) 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.019 0.015 0.039 0.085 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
























Exp*Post 0.0109* 0.0253** 0.0171 -0.0430 0.0151 0.0272** -0.0172 0.102** 
 (0.00541) (0.0122) (0.0262) (0.0432) (0.0102) (0.0129) (0.0341) (0.0468) 
Observations (A) 60,063 18,199 4,468 1,596 66,388 17,930 4,287 1,867 
R-squared (A) 0.014 0.008 0.034 0.052 0.016 0.012 0.031 0.066 
Sample B: FPL<138% 
Exp*Post 0.00331 0.0251*** 0.00741 -0.0109 0.0176 0.0440** 0.00990 0.139 
  (0.00912) (0.00746) (0.0612) (0.0271) (0.0197) (0.0210) (0.0232) (0.120) 
Observations (B) 25,129 8,946 1,936 860 25,138 8,284 1,697 962 
R-squared (B) 0.015 0.012 0.053 0.083 0.012 0.018 0.045 0.140 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust Standard Errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Sample is restricted to 
childless adults between the ages of 26 and 64. Individual characters are controlled for (i.e. age, gender, race, 
education, marital and foreign birth status). 
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The Effect of Medicaid Expansion on Self-Employment Under Differing Partisan Control 
of the State Governmental Offices 
Table 6 includes the output from the baseline regression with the additional gubernatorial 
regressor. While the 300 percent sample still shows expansion states to have a statistically 
significant higher self-employment rate, albeit it at a diminished magnitude, the addition of the 
gubernational regressors reduces the magnitude of the expansion effect in the 138 percent sample 
so that it is statistically insignificant. While the overall increase is diminished, there are similar 
effects of expansion on African Americans, men, and all the other demographic groups as in the 
baseline, providing some additional reassurance of the subgroup baseline results.  
While the gubernatorial regressor coefficients may reflect interesting trends, these 
variables are designed as controls within this model and their coefficients should not be viewed 
as causal. It is likely inappropriate to interpret these results as evidence that Republican or 
Democratic state control is better or worse at spurring entrepreneurship across different 
demographic subgroups. There are many other factors that partisan control maybe capturing 
including a state’s general political and business policy climate or some other unobserved factor. 
Instead, a different model with the explicit goal of capturing the causal effect of a party’s control 
of state political offices on entrepreneurship would have be constructed. The above results are, 
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Table 6. Results from Difference in Difference Regressions with Partisan Regressors 
by Demographic Group 
 
















Exp*Post 0.0141*** 0.0146* 0.0134** 0.0114* 0.0268*** -0.00672 0.0292 
 (0.00436) (0.00763) (0.00518) (0.00624) (0.00962) (0.0225) (0.0374) 
 Republican Governor -0.00429** -0.00570 -0.00276** -0.00505** -0.00145 -0.00885 -0.0191* 
 (0.00206) (0.00345) (0.00133) (0.00239) (0.00390) (0.00810) (0.0106) 
Republican Legislature 0.00798** 0.0145** 0.000528 0.00618 0.00655 -0.0341 -0.0629 
 (0.00386) (0.00619) (0.00369) (0.00463) (0.00677) (0.0347) (0.0428) 
        
Mixed Legislature 0.00377 0.00693 -0.000371 0.00435 -0.00240 0.00860 -0.0584 
 (0.00301) (0.00418) (0.00265) (0.00331) (0.00692) (0.00707) (0.0353) 
Observations (A) 179,201 92,732 86,469 126,451 36,129 8,755 3,463 
R-squared (A) 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.019 0.012 0.028 0.049 
Sample B: FPL<138% 
Exp*Post 0.0121 0.0198 0.00404 0.00685 0.0371*** -0.0122 0.0701 
  (0.00808) (0.0143) (0.00729) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.0399) (0.0762) 
 Republican Governor -0.00750*** -0.0104* -0.00470* -0.00928** 0.00105 -0.0223** -0.0213 
 (0.00249) (0.00524) (0.00274) (0.00361) (0.00371) (0.00941) (0.0191) 
Republican Legislature 0.0177*** 0.0259** 0.00957 0.0147* 0.0180* -0.0245 -0.0593 
 (0.00605) (0.00984) (0.00638) (0.00780) (0.00900) (0.0249) (0.0444) 
        
Mixed Legislature 0.0109* 0.00833 0.0133** 0.0130* 0.00103 0.0223 -0.0385 
 (0.00619) (0.00846) (0.00496) (0.00675) (0.00817) (0.0136) (0.0399) 
        
Observations (B) 74,830 36,971 37,859 50,267 17,230 3,633 1,822 
R-squared (B) 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.018 0.015 0.040 0.087 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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FPL<300%         
Exp*Post 0.00937* 0.0269** 0.0159 -0.0666 0.0130 0.0267** -0.0293 0.102* 
 (0.00550) (0.0123) (0.0286) (0.0491) (0.0108) (0.0114) (0.0310) (0.0513) 
 Republican Governor -0.00358** 0.00280 -0.00253 -0.0404** -0.00629 -0.00554 -0.0126 
-
0.00428 
 (0.00133) (0.00422) (0.0128) (0.0171) (0.00456) (0.00562) (0.00862) (0.0155) 
Republican Legislature -0.00232 0.0104* -0.00491 -0.0550 0.0136 0.00350 -0.0638 -0.0788 
 (0.00418) (0.00509) (0.0268) (0.0469) (0.00825) (0.0111) (0.0551) (0.0473) 
         
Mixed Legislature  -0.000358 0.00332 0.000160 -0.0286 0.00790 -0.00725 0.0135 
-
0.0874* 
 (0.00299) (0.00341) (0.00802) (0.0268) (0.00516) (0.0113) (0.00987) (0.0470) 
Observations (A) 60,063 18,199 4,468 1,596 66,388 17,930 4,287 1,867 
R-squared (A) 0.014 0.008 0.034 0.060 0.016 0.013 0.032 0.070 
Sample B: FPL<138% 
Exp*Post -0.000303 0.0271*** 0.00356 -0.0434 0.0139 0.0461** -0.00928 0.141 
  (0.00960) (0.00753) (0.0623) (0.0272) (0.0217) (0.0207) (0.0237) (0.131) 
 Republican Governor -0.00562* 0.00288 -0.0172 -0.0491*** -0.0123 -0.00139 -0.0205 
-
0.00479 
 (0.00319) (0.00348) (0.0134) (0.0153) (0.00764) (0.00634) (0.0122) (0.0331) 
Republican Legislature 0.00460 0.0178** 0.0581 -0.0554* 0.0254* 0.0181 -0.101* -0.0905 
 (0.00737) (0.00827) (0.0384) (0.0274) (0.0137) (0.0121) (0.0588) (0.0640) 
         
Mixed Legislature  0.0164*** 0.00656 0.00931 -0.00950 0.00904 -0.00390 0.0322 -0.0824 
 (0.00467) (0.00578) (0.0135) (0.0221) (0.0102) (0.0117) (0.0342) (0.0644) 
Observations (B) 25,129 8,946 1,936 860 25,138 8,284 1,697 962 
R-squared (B) 0.015 0.012 0.054 0.095 0.013 0.019 0.050 0.143 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust Standard Errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Sample is restricted to 
married childless adults between the ages of 26 and 64. Individual characters are controlled for (i.e. age, gender, race, 
education, marital and foreign birth status). 
 
Implications of Providing an Alternative Source of Healthcare 
The above results suggest that Medicaid expansion and access to alternative and cheaper 
healthcare options has a positive effect on firm creation and entrepreneurship. If the increases 
observed above hold true across income ranges, this suggests that providing alternative cheaper 
healthcare would increase the self-employment rate to about 11.5 percent, about a 14 percent 
increase from the 10.1 percent self-employment rate in 2015, and would create 210,000 new 
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businesses (Hipple & Hammond 2016).7 Assuming all these new firms have employees, then the 
addition of these firms would create 1.281 million new jobs.8 This is likely a large overestimate, 
as younger firms are more likely to be unincorporated and not have employees. If a slightly more 
realistic assumption that only a fourth of new firms are employer is used, then 320,250 new jobs 
would be created.9 
 Significant increases in self-employment and the formulation of new young small firms 
could lead to substantial increases in innovations within the United States. In industries with the 
greatest number of innovations, small firms have a 6.64 times greater innovation-per-employee 
rate than larger firms (Acs& Audretsch 1988). Additionally, research by Allison, Lemley, 
Moore, and Trunkey (2003) found that individual inventors, small businesses, and small non-
profit entities have a higher proportion of litigated patents than larger firms. 39.2 percent of 
ligated patents in their sample were initially issued to small entities whereas only 13.6 percent of 
litigated patents in the sample were initially issued to larger firms. This difference in patent 
ligation suggests that small and younger firms not only produce more innovation-per-employee, 
but that these patent innovations are also of higher value.10 New small firms that arise from the 
provision of an alternative source of health insurance could therefore spur a greater volume of 
valuable innovations.  
 Increases to the self-employment rate are particularly importance today given the 
declining level of self-employment over the last few decades. The self-employment rate has 
fallen from 12.1 percent in 1994 to 10.1 percent in 2015. The unincorporated self-employment 
rate specifically, fell from 8.7 percent to 6.4 percent over the same time period (Hipple & 
Hammond 2016). Graph 3 below shows the declining trend in the overall and unincorporated 
self-employment rate between 1994 and 2015. One analysis found that the firm creation rate has 
fallen by 27 percent and that this lower rate led to a loss of 1.7 million jobs between 2006 and 
2011 (Gourio & Siemer 2014). If, as this paper’s analysis suggests, alternative healthcare spurs 
business formulation, then providing these alternatives could be a strong tool in reversing this 
current downward trend.  
 
 
7 The estimate of 210,000 new firms come from a 1.4 percent increase in the 15 million people who identified as 
self-employed in 2015. This is likely a large overestimate as becoming self-employed is not the same as starting a 
business or new firm.  
8 These projections are based of the estimates that new firms had 6.1 employees on average in 2011 (Hathaway, 
Bell-Masterson & Stangler 2013). These projections are a large overestimate considering that not all increases in 
self-employment lead to business with employees.  
9 75 percent of small businesses were not employers (SBA 2012). The job creation estimate is based of the 
assumption that alternative health care would create 52,500 new employer firms and that they would have an 
average of 6.1 employees. This is still likely a large overestimate of the effects of new firms.  
10 Litigation is used as a proxy for the value of patents in the study as litigated patents have a higher number of 
claims, cite more prior art and are cited by other patents more often than issued patents. For a greater explanation of 
why litigation us used as an indicator of patent value see Allison, Lemley, Moore, and Trunkey (2003). 
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Graph 3. Self-employment rates by Incorporation Status, 1994-2015 
 
Source: Page 3 of Hipple & Hammond 2016 
These finding also have considerable significance given the current healthcare debate in 
the United States. During the 2020 presidential elections and primary cycle, Democratic 
candidates have proposed a variety of different plans to expanded alternative access to 
healthcare. The most contentious and ambiguous of these plans has been a Medicare for All 
system, under which the entire US population would be eligible for Medicare. While this paper 
does not shed insight into the feasibility or cost of such a plan, it does provide some evidence 
that a Medicare for All type system could increase self-employment.  
 These findings also suggest that providing alternative healthcare could be especially 
powerful in promoting minority businesses. If these findings hold across all income groups and 
all new firms were unincorporated, then an alternative source of insurance would increase the 
unincorporated self-employment rate for African Americans from 3.6 percent to about 6.3 
percent, almost doubling it (Hipple & Hammond 2016). Under the same assumptions, the female 
unincorporated self-employment rate would rise from 5.2 percent to about 6.5 percent (Hipple & 
Hammond 2016). Graph 4 below shows these projected changes in self-employment overall and 
by demographic group.  These increases could be important to federal agencies charged with 
promoting small business development, such as the Small Business Administration (SBA), and 
agencies trying to promote minority business development, such as the Minority Business 
Development Agency (MBDA).  
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Graph 4. Current and Projected Change in Self-Employment Rate by Demographic Group 
 
 
Limitations of the Model  
 
There are several limitations to the results presented above and the general model used for this 
analysis. Notably, self-employment is only a proxy for entrepreneurship and not a direct measure 
of it. Further, these results would be invalid if the parallel trends assumption is violated. There 
are also a variety of other limitations to the model that threaten the validity of the results.  
 The first limitation of the analysis is that Medicaid expansion in a state does not mean an 
increase in coverage. Eligible individuals may not enroll in the program. Expansion does not 
capture the size of scope enrollment increases. Additionally, income is often not static over the 
course of a year and someone may be eligible to enroll in Medicaid one month but not the next 
or may re-enroll over the course of a year. However, increased access to alternative insurance 
options may reduce risk and lower entrepreneurship lock even if an individual does not actually 
enroll in Medicaid. 
 The second limitation of the analysis is a lack of statistical weights. There are several 
differences between the treatment and control group that could skew results or even invalidate 
them if these differences are correlated with self-employment. Other researchers have 
compensated for these differences by creating propensity weight scores and further research on 
this topic could supplement this analysis by including such scoring. Additionally, the data used 
for this paper comes from CPS which is a repeated cross-sectional dataset that may experiences 
changes in the consumption of its random sample overtime. While ASEC weights provided with 
the CPS survey are used to account for some of this variation, unaccounted changes may still 

















Overall African American Female
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 The third limitation of this analysis is that is does not account for a possible demand 
shock. Medicaid recipients may have additional income from not paying for healthcare or health-
related costs. If new recipients consume more goods locally as a result of these funds, it could 
create a demand shock that has producers increase output and make self-employment more 
attractive. In an attempt to account for this limitation and determine if a demand shock occurred, 
a difference in difference model is presented in the Appendix that has the same specification as 
the baseline model but with wage-earners as the output variable instead of self-employment 
(Table A and B). If a demand shock occurred, we would expect the coefficient on ExpS * Postt  
to be positive, statistically significant, and similar to the coefficient found in the baseline self-
employment model. Results are also presented for wage-earners in the model with partisan 
regressors. The coefficient on these regressors are statistically insignificant and negligible in 
magnitude, suggesting that the increase in self-employment is not due solely to a demand shock. 
 The fourth limitation of the modeling is the small number of observations and R-squared 
values for some of the regressions. Some of the demographic specific analyses have a rather low 
level of observations, with the gender-specific Native American regressions having less than 
1,000 observations. Given the large amount of noise in self-employments rates, a small number 
of observations likely makes these results rather imprecise. The regressions also have rather low 
R-squared value, below .02 in most cases. This R-squared value cannot be compared to other 
papers on this subject as most do not provide these values.11 While this value is rather low, R-
squared values do not represent the validity of a model.  
 The fifth and final limitation of the modeling is that it only applies to low-income 
individuals. Since the samples are limited to 300 percent and 138 percent of the FPL, the results 
are not representative of the entire income spectrum, as assumed in the implication section. Since 
Medicaid was only expanded to these lower-income groups, the expansion would likely have 
little to no effect on other higher income populations. Therefore, the results may not be 
externally valid for higher income populations. Future research into this natural experiment and 
other issues relating to entrepreneurship lock should attempt to supplement the modeling used in 
this analysis and account for these limitations.  
 
Other Areas for Future Research 
 
Besides improvements to the above model, there are several other areas future researchers could 
explore. First, future researchers could use an Instrumental Variable (IV) model to measure the 
effect of self-employment outcomes by demographic groups for those who actually enrolled in 
Medicaid (compliers), instead of those who simply lived in an expansion state.12 This research 
would provide greater insight into the outcomes for those who actually enrolled in Medicaid 
instead of the net effect. If possible, it would also be useful to compare eligible individuals who 
 
11 While most papers on predicting entrepreneurship did not include R-squared values, those that do vary widely 
from 0.1 (Luo & Chong) to 0.8 (Becker & Tuzman 2015).  
12 For previous work using IV modeling and ACA Medicaid expansion see Lee (2019).  
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enrolled in Medicaid to eligible individuals who did not enroll and measure differences in self-
employment outcomes between the two groups.  
 Another area future researcher should examine is if different demographic groups 
experienced reduced entrepreneurship lock through a different mechanism. These results could 
find, for example, if African Americans respond more to a reduction in risk (the risk channel) or 
additional capital (the credit channel). These results would be useful for policymakers, as they 
could target a channel specifically to spur entrepreneurship among certain target populations. In 
the Appendix, a preliminary analysis of the mechanisms through which the Medicaid expansion 
reduced entrepreneurship lock is presented (Table C and D), but a more robust model is likely 
needed. 
 Finally, future researchers should examine the quality (e.g. if a firm is incorporated, has 
employees, etc.) of new businesses produced by the Medicaid expansion. In the implications 
section, it was assumed that the newly self-employed mirrored the general proportion of small 
and new businesses. However, this may not be true as low-income households have different 
characteristics than the general population. Research by Balkin (1989) found that low-income 
households tend to start business that are smaller and less sophisticated than higher income 
groups. While this sort of analysis is currently hampered by a lack of strong information about 
firm characteristics, especially information that includes demographic information about the 




This paper examined the effect expanding Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) had 
on reducing entrepreneurship lock and increasing self-employment levels of different 
demographic groups. This project built off previous research on the Medicaid expansion by 
including partisan control variables within regressions and by including previously unused years 
of new data. The results found that Medicaid expansion improved self-employment rates by 
about 1.4 percent when accounting for political factors within a state, and that the increase in 
self-employment was greatest among the African American community. If valid and applicable 
to the entire income spectrum, the results suggest that providing an alternative source of 
healthcare could create up to 210,000 new businesses and create 1.281 million new jobs. Future 
research should expand upon these findings by addressing some of the limitation of this study 
and by exploring alternative and differently targeted specifications to the modeling.  
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Table A. Results from Wage Earner Baseline Difference in Difference Regressions 
















Exp*Post -0.00907 -0.0147 -0.00432 -0.0104 -0.0107 -0.0409 0.0637 
 (0.0118) (0.0207) (0.00882) (0.0120) (0.0202) (0.0467) (0.103) 
Observations (A) 179,201 92,732 86,469 126,451 36,129 8,755 3,463 
R-squared (A) 0.088 0.104 0.075 0.099 0.078 0.047 0.134 
Sample B: FPL<138% 
Exp*Post -0.00292 -0.00373 -0.00482 0.00255 -0.0165 -0.0288 -0.203 
  (0.0165) (0.0290) (0.0132) (0.0193) (0.0240) (0.0772) (0.131) 
Observations (B) 74,830 36,971 37,859 50,267 17,230 3,633 1,822 
R-squared (B) 0.077 0.107 0.054 0.090 0.066 0.038 0.173 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 























Exp*Post -0.00763 0.00249 -0.0247 0.0694 -0.0135 -0.0233 -0.0376 0.0617 
 (0.0133) (0.0221) (0.0630) (0.119) (0.0211) (0.0281) (0.0672) (0.126) 
Observations (A) 60,063 18,199 4,468 1,596 66,388 17,930 4,287 1,867 
R-squared (A) 0.084 0.072 0.058 0.113 0.117 0.091 0.050 0.184 
Sample B: FPL<138% 
Exp*Post 0.00349 -0.0380 -0.0626 -0.0600 0.000903 0.00635 0.0251 -0.340** 
  (0.0140) (0.0257) (0.111) (0.180) (0.0345) (0.0348) (0.107) (0.135) 
Observations (B) 25,129 8,946 1,936 860 25,138 8,284 1,697 962 
R-squared (B) 0.062 0.058 0.044 0.193 0.124 0.085 0.067 0.261 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust Standard Errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Sample is restricted to 
childless adults between the ages of 26 and 64. Individual characters are controlled for (i.e. age, gender, race, 
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Table B. Results from Wage Earners Difference in Difference Regressions with Partisan 
Regressors 
 
















Exp*Post -0.00905 -0.0148 -0.00451 -0.00851 -0.0141 -0.0401 0.0538 
 (0.0123) (0.0219) (0.00802) (0.0128) (0.0208) (0.0487) (0.106) 
 Republican Governor 0.000591 0.000380 -0.000315 0.00688* -0.0177** -0.00148 -0.0294 
 (0.00376) (0.00594) (0.00485) (0.00362) (0.00651) (0.0176) (0.0267) 
Republican Legislature -0.00610 -0.0120 0.00240 -0.00608 -0.0131 -0.0559 0.0545 
 (0.0128) (0.0219) (0.0137) (0.0149) (0.0187) (0.0389) (0.0419) 
Mixed Legislature -0.00295 -0.00760 0.00250 0.00269 -0.0274* -0.0721*** 0.0375 
 (0.0124) (0.0164) (0.00960) (0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0229) (0.0372) 
Observations (A) 179,201 92,732 86,469 126,451 36,129 8,755 3,463 
R-squared (A) 0.088 0.104 0.075 0.100 0.078 0.047 0.134 
Sample B: FPL<138% 
Exp*Post -0.00312 -0.00488 -0.00431 0.00501 -0.0212 -0.0292 -0.216 
  (0.0175) (0.0308) (0.0121) (0.0203) (0.0252) (0.0813) (0.136) 
 Republican Governor 0.00175 0.00167 0.000244 0.00959 -0.0165 -0.00596 -0.0375 
 (0.00545) (0.00878) (0.00587) (0.00632) (0.0134) (0.0243) (0.0235) 
Republican Legislature 0.00923 -0.00417 0.0277 0.0159 -0.0132 -0.112 0.109* 
 (0.0145) (0.0295) (0.0167) (0.0123) (0.0269) (0.0805) (0.0599) 
Mixed Legislature 0.0141 0.0119 0.0174 0.0229* -0.0154 -0.109* 0.0614 
 (0.0127) (0.0209) (0.0108) (0.0117) (0.0233) (0.0552) (0.0518) 
Observations (B) 74,830 36,971 37,859 50,267 17,230 3,633 1,822 
R-squared (B) 0.077 0.107 0.054 0.090 0.066 0.039 0.175 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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FPL<300%         
Exp*Post -0.00557 -0.00286 -0.0217 0.0876 -0.0121 -0.0249 -0.0392 0.0382 
 (0.0138) (0.0235) (0.0612) (0.124) (0.0225) (0.0289) (0.0691) (0.126) 
 Republican Governor 0.00710 -0.0224** 0.000818 -0.00625 0.00569 -0.0142* -0.00269 -0.0348 
 (0.00632) (0.00884) (0.0166) (0.0239) (0.00604) (0.00748) (0.0221) (0.0406) 
Republican Legislature 0.00552 -0.0145 -0.0578 0.146** -0.0131 -0.00711 -0.0517 -0.0249 
 (0.0154) (0.0204) (0.115) (0.0581) (0.0254) (0.0245) (0.138) (0.0713) 
Mixed Legislature  0.0104 -0.0262** -0.0873** 0.0305 -0.00197 -0.0271 -0.0508 0.0269 
 (0.0130) (0.0110) (0.0323) (0.0508) (0.0180) (0.0206) (0.0488) (0.0492) 
Observations (A) 60,063 18,199 4,468 1,596 66,388 17,930 4,287 1,867 
R-squared (A) 0.084 0.072 0.059 0.115 0.117 0.091 0.051 0.185 
Sample B: FPL<138% 
Exp*Post 0.00779 -0.0448* -0.0617 -0.0124 0.00111 0.00464 0.0272 
-
0.370** 
  (0.0127) (0.0260) (0.112) (0.182) (0.0356) (0.0367) (0.100) (0.142) 
 Republican Governor 0.0132 -0.0309** -0.00255 0.00681 0.00468 -0.000991 -0.00544 -0.0461 
 (0.00858) (0.0113) (0.0223) (0.0337) (0.00933) (0.0220) (0.0397) (0.0327) 
Republican Legislature 0.0295 0.0190 -0.165 0.270*** 0.00703 -0.0404 -0.0229 0.0104 
 (0.0236) (0.0309) (0.102) (0.0918) (0.0323) (0.0360) (0.154) (0.112) 
Mixed Legislature  0.0279** -0.00970 -0.124* 0.0439 0.0202 -0.0210 -0.0733 0.0574 
 (0.0111) (0.0238) (0.0642) (0.0585) (0.0203) (0.0315) (0.0975) (0.0796) 
Observations (B) 25,129 8,946 1,936 860 25,138 8,284 1,697 962 
R-squared (B) 0.062 0.059 0.045 0.202 0.124 0.085 0.068 0.263 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust Standard Errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Sample is restricted to married childless adults 
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Difference in Difference Models with Healthcare Demand 
 As previously discussed, when examining entrepreneurship lock arising from healthcare 
it is critical that healthcare demand is considered to avoid the good job problem.14 Thus, in order 
to correctly test if the Medicaid expansion relieved entrepreneurship lock, I use a model that 
proxies healthcare demand. The healthcare demand model has the following specification:  
Self-Employmentist = αo+β1(ExpS * Postt) + β2(ExpS * Postt*Demist) + Xist  + δs + τt + εist 
Where everything is the same as the baseline regression but there is the additional interaction 
term ExpS * Postt*Demist where Demist is the demand proxy variable. I use two different variables 
in Demist. The first is if one’s partner has employer-based health insurance and serves as a 
measure for the availability of alternative healthcare. The second is if anyone in the respondent’s 
household is reported to have poor health and is a measure of increased expected healthcare 
costs.15 The sample used for this specification is further restricted to married childless adults. 
This demand model is also based on a similar methodological framework used by Lee (2019).  
Using these two different variables to proxy healthcare demand has the additional benefit 
providing insight into through which mechanism the Medicaid expansion may have alleviated 
entrepreneurship lock. Not having access to partner’s employer-based health insurance measures 
the risk channel and poor health status measures the credit constraint channel. If the β2 on either 
of these variables is positive and statistically significant, this would suggest that the Medicaid 








14 See the discussion of Holtz-Eakin, Penrod, Rosen (1994) in the Literature Review.  
15 Since the Affordable Care Act forbid private insurance companies from denying coverage to an applicant because 
of pre-existing condition, poor health would not affect one access to alternative healthcare plans. However, since 
this person would be in the individual instead of group-based market, they would likely face higher premiums and 
total healthcare coverage costs.   
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Table C. Spousal Coverage  
















Exp*Post -0.0112 -0.0112 -0.0123 -0.00805 -0.0160 -0.0527 -0.00600 
 (0.0100) (0.0164) (0.0113) (0.0124) (0.0146) (0.0369) (0.0948) 
 Exp*Post*Spouse 0.0504*** 0.0695*** 0.0320*** 0.0529*** 0.0236* 0.0543*** 0.0619** 
 (0.00646) (0.0105) (0.00501) (0.00778) (0.0119) (0.0164) (0.0264) 
Observations (A) 56,642 27,383 29,259 42,932 7,886 3,723 906 
R-squared (A) 0.023 0.017 0.011 0.025 0.019 0.039 0.109 
Sample B: FPL<138% 
Exp*Post -0.00182 0.000471 -0.00512 -0.000287 0.00822 -0.0659 0.0443 
  (0.0184) (0.0347) (0.0189) (0.0252) (0.0495) (0.0411) (0.0757) 
 Exp*Post*Spouse 0.0415*** 0.0583*** 0.0247** 0.0475*** 0.0152 0.0436*** -0.00201 
 (0.00922) (0.0148) (0.0102) (0.0118) (0.0211) (0.0133) (0.0865) 
Observations (B) 19,147 9,205 9,942 14,127 2,724 1,505 380 
R-squared (B) 0.028 0.022 0.014 0.029 0.044 0.051 0.202 
State FE (A&B) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






















FPL<300%         
Exp*Post -0.00913 -0.0384* -0.0333 -0.125 -0.00761 0.00232 -0.0859 0.163 
 (0.0128) (0.0189) (0.0475) (0.0905) (0.0196) (0.0314) (0.0708) (0.158) 
Exp*Post*Spouse 0.0318*** 0.0244 0.0361** 0.0464*** 0.0749*** 0.0221 0.0748*** 0.112** 
 (0.00603) (0.0144) (0.0133) (0.0161) (0.0124) (0.0172) (0.0248) (0.0542) 
Observations (A) 22,088 4,056 2,029 457 20,844 3,830 1,694 449 
R-squared (A) 0.012 0.019 0.043 0.195 0.020 0.023 0.038 0.160 
Sample B: FPL<138% 
Exp*Post -0.00231 -0.0153 -0.0282 -0.151** -0.000409 0.0277 -0.0676* 0.216 
  (0.0254) (0.0325) (0.0632) (0.0588) (0.0418) (0.0971) (0.0373) (0.134) 
 Exp*Post*Spouse 0.0262** 0.0174* 0.0305** 0.0994 0.0706*** 0.00694 0.0468** -0.0883 
 (0.0127) (0.00913) (0.0117) (0.0735) (0.0180) (0.0389) (0.0174) (0.256) 
Observations (B) 7,278 1,422 825 191 6,849 1,302 680 189 
R-squared (B) 0.015 0.041 0.053 0.392 0.024 0.065 0.070 0.381 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust Standard Errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Sample is restricted to 
married childless adults between the ages of 26 and 64. Individual characters are controlled for (i.e. age, gender, race, 
education, marital and foreign birth status). 
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Table D. Poor Health 
















Exp*Post 0.0333*** 0.0514*** 0.0154 0.0397*** 0.00363 -0.0143 0.0399 
 (0.00949) (0.0168) (0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0356) (0.107) 
 Exp*Post*Health -0.0455*** -0.0658*** -0.0278*** -0.0524*** -0.0154 0.00596 -0.0266 
 (0.00361) (0.00709) (0.00516) (0.00327) (0.0158) (0.0139) (0.0178) 
Observations (A) 56,642 27,383 29,259 42,932 7,886 3,723 906 
R-squared (A) 0.023 0.017 0.011 0.026 0.018 0.037 0.107 
Sample B: FPL<138% 
Exp*Post 0.0400** 0.0600 0.0195 0.0489** 0.0223 -0.0362 0.0479 
  (0.0177) (0.0358) (0.0147) (0.0237) (0.0306) (0.0419) (0.0680) 
 Exp*Post*Health -0.0278*** -0.0410*** -0.0159* -0.0337*** -0.00451 0.00841 -0.0165 
 (0.00711) (0.0123) (0.00874) (0.00812) (0.0215) (0.0107) (0.0722) 
Observations (B) 19,147 9,205 9,942 14,127 2,724 1,505 380 
R-squared (B) 0.028 0.022 0.014 0.029 0.044 0.050 0.202 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






















FPL<300%         
Exp*Post 0.0198* -0.0239 -0.00352 -0.116 0.0602*** 0.0290 -0.0395 0.257 
 (0.0109) (0.0149) (0.0414) (0.0903) (0.0184) (0.0255) (0.0675) (0.180) 
Exp*Post*Health -0.0330*** 0.00113 -0.0191 0.0342 -0.0738*** -0.0341 0.0344 -0.0902 
 (0.00639) (0.0141) (0.0124) (0.0283) (0.00648) (0.0238) (0.0227) (0.0597) 
Observations (A) 22,088 4,056 2,029 457 20,844 3,830 1,694 449 
R-squared (A) 0.012 0.017 0.042 0.194 0.020 0.024 0.035 0.159 
Sample B: FPL<138% 
Exp*Post 0.0247 0.00527 -0.00480 -0.101 0.0731 0.0307 -0.0395 0.181 
  (0.0190) (0.0347) (0.0648) (0.0716) (0.0437) (0.0693) (0.0317) (0.132) 
 Exp*Post*Health -0.0182 -0.0195** 0.0158 0.0263 -0.0500*** 0.00648 -0.000621 -0.0219 
 (0.0124) (0.00784) (0.0201) (0.0668) (0.0118) (0.0384) (0.0342) (0.123) 
Observations (B) 7,278 1,422 825 191 6,849 1,302 680 189 
R-squared (B) 0.015 0.042 0.052 0.385 0.024 0.065 0.069 0.380 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust Standard Errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Sample is restricted to 
married childless adults between the ages of 26 and 64. Individual characters are controlled for (i.e. age, gender, race, 
education, marital and foreign birth status. 
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